This CVE resulted from a product study project I conducted with the one and only: Gad Abuazira :top:

How it all started?

My Dell computer often has a low battery issue. I called Dell assistance to find out what was going on because I had a product warranty.

I was instructed to download the aforementioned item: https://www.dell.com/support/incidents-online/he-il/remoteassist.

image-20230427235947237

figure 1.0

The ‘code’ was mailed to me, and then we began a session where the supporter could manage my PC:

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figure 1.1

I divided my computer into two screens so that the supporter could work on one screen while I launched WireShark on the other :sweat_smile:

The communication between my PC and their server was then visible to me.

Scanning for fun

To facilitate the scanning process, I used netstat to determine which IP address and port DellRemoteAssist.exe had open on my PC:

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figure 1.2

  TCP    192.168.68.105:54264   75.2.88.11:443         ESTABLISHED     1216
  TCP    192.168.68.105:54265   75.2.88.11:443         ESTABLISHED     1216

I could now search more precisely on WireShark:

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figure 1.3


Rate Limit bypass discovery

Figure 1.0 shows that there is a “code” that we insert and connect to the supporter. The request looks like this when burp intercepts it:

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figure 2.0

Two fields are included in the request:

  1. The ‘code’ that the Dell support assistant provided to the user.
  2. ‘server_tag’ with the default setting.

There is no limit on your request if you sent it to Intruder and brute-forced the “code” field.

There are many 200 status codes scattered throughout the requests that identify other users’ support sessions:

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figure 2.1

The response includes private user and supporter data:

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figure 2.2

We moved to the supporter-user session after entering the other user’s code:

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figure 2.3

The end :cat: